|
No. 41
(December 2005):
India's Place in the US Strategic Order
India as a 'Global Power'
 I. The Reality of India
II. The Class Logic of the Indian Rulers' Drive for 'Great-Power' Status
III. From Central Asia to the Gulf to the South China Sea
IV. Why the US Promotes India's Great-Power Ambitions
V. In Conclusion
Client State
App. I: Indo-US Joint Military Exercises after 2002 – A Partial List
App. II: Growing Relationship with Israel
App. III: Manufacturing Justifications for an Aggressive Alliance
App. IV: Internal Requirements of 'Great-Power' Status
App. V: Text of Recent Indo-US Agreements |
Appendix IV
Internal Requirements of 'Great-Power' Status
The US expects that India, as part of its responsibilities in the developing alliance, will look after insurgencies and instability in neighbouring countries as well as within its own territory. At the same time, the US is extending help to the Indian government in both these tasks. This is indicated, though not spelled out, by the US War College study:
Actually, at least 14 terrorist and separatist movements “of varying rigor and intensity”, other than the violence in Jammu and Kashmir, “are raging across India”. Recognising this, the US government has discreetly, but clearly, acknowledged that the challenges to security in areas like Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar could open up a third front in the war on terrorism and prevent the full fruition of its growing ties to India....
... for Indo-American security partnership, these insurgencies and threats along India’s peripheries beyond the struggle in Kashmir point simultaneously in two directions. On the one hand, they highlight the obstacles to India’s grandiose vision of the future and give reasons for alarm about India’s own internal stability. If India cannot find the means to overcome these challenges, even if they are protracted operations, its stability, that of South Asia, and the heralded arrival of a great power will be set back considerably. On the other hand, the threat of spreading terrorism, insurgencies and failing states has galvanized US officials into taking broader action with India to confront those challenges. Ultimately, the cooperation that that we now see along India’s peripheries could serve as a starting point for future highly beneficial security cooperation in the other key areas of Indo-American interests.14
Notes:
14. Natural Allies, pp 34-35; emphasis added. (back)
NEXT: App. V: Text of Indo-US Agreements
|
